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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACER SPORT & CYCLE, INC., ^ 
Respondent-Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK MYERS and CARL W. MY-
ERS, 
Appellant-Defendant. J 
Case No. 
13839 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action on an Installment Sale and Security 
Agreement (motor vehicle) for the purchase of a motor-
cycle. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, M. D. Jones, Judge Pro 
Tern, denied defendant, Carl W. Myers' motion to set 
aside default judgment against him, which motion was 
brought pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, Carl W. Myers, seeks justice and equity 
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by a reversal of the order of the Lower Court denying 
his motion to set aside the default judgment against him, 
and an opportunity to have all of the issues presented 
to the Court in conformity with law and justice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, is the 
father of the other named defendant, Frank Myers. Prior 
to April 3, 1972, Frank Myers, the son of appellant, en-
tered into an agreement with Robert Reeves, an officer 
of Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc., respondent-plaintiff, to race 
the Maico brand of motorcycle marketed and sold by 
respondent-plaintiff. Under this arrangement, defendant, 
Frank Myers, was to race the motorcycle under the name 
of Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc.; Pacer Cycle was to furnish 
Frank Myers, a new Maico motorcycle for which he was 
to sign a security agreement. No payments were con-
templated to be made in that Pacer Cycle was to retake 
possession of the motorcycle every ninety (90) days and 
resell the same and replace it with a new motorcycle; and 
Pacer Cycle was to pay all costs of repairs to the motor-
cycle during the time that Frank Myers was racing the 
same under the name of plaintiff. 
Appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, was made 
aware of this agreement and was present at the time the 
agreement was entered into between defendant, Frank 
Myers, and plaintiff, Pacer Cycle. At the time Frank 
Myers signed the Installment Sale and Security Agree-
ment, appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, was requested 
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to co-sign the agreement with his son as additional se-
curity for the return of the motorcycle placed in the 
possession of defendant, Frank Myers, Appellant-defen-
dant, Carl W. Myers, signed the Installment Sale and 
Security Agreement, which is the basis of the default 
judgment against him, in reliance upon the representa-
tion of Robert Reeves, the officer of Pacer Cycle, that no 
payments were expected to be made under the arrange-
ment with his son, Frank Myers, as stated. 
The Installment Sale and Security Agreement was 
signed by appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, on or 
about April 3, 1972, and possession of the motorcycle 
described therein was given to defendant, Frank Myers. 
Frank Myers did in fact race the motorcycle under the 
name of Pacer Sport & Cycle pursuant to agreement. 
In the latter part of April, 1972, the motorcycle failed 
and needed repair. Defendant, Frank Myers, returned 
the cycle to plaintiff, P&cer Cycle, for repair under the 
agreement, at which time Pacer Cycle refused to repair 
the cycle as agreed. Defendant, Frank Myers, thereafter 
terminated his relationship with Pacer Cycle by reason 
of their refusal to repair the cycle as agreed and at that 
time considered his arrangement with Pacer Cycle to 
be terminated. 
The date on the Installment Sale and Security 
Agreement, a copy of which was attached to plaintiff's 
complaint as an Exhibit (R. 49), was changed and the 
contract was then sold or assigned to Zions First Na-
tional Bank by endorsement on the reverse side thereof. 
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The motorcycle was subsequently repossessed by Zions 
First National Bank on or about January 3, 1973, as 
shown by the affidavit attached to plaintiff's complaint 
(R. 50). Plaintiff, Pacer Cycle, commenced a suit on July 
11, 1973. Summons was served on appellant-defendant, 
Carl W. Myers, only, on July 11, 1973, but the re-
turn of summons was not filed with the Court until July 
1, 1974, approximately one (1) year later, the same day 
default judgment was taken against appellant-defendant, 
Carl W. Myere, July 1, 1974. 
Appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, filed his motion 
to set aside the default judgment entered against him 
on July 31, 1974, well within the three (3) month re-
quirement of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. The motion was argued to the Court on August 
12, 1974, with Salt Lake City Judge, M. D. Jones, sitting 
as Judge Pro Tem. The motion of appellant-defendant, 
Carl W. Myers, was denied on or about August 19, 1974, 
although the order on record appears to have been signed 
on August 10, 1974, (R. 29), two days before the motion 
was actually heard. The defendant, Frank Myers, was 
never served with summons in this action. He entered 
the action voluntarily by filing an answer and counter-
claim to the complaint of plaintiff-respondent, and no 
trial or hearing has been held in connection therewith. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DENIAL OF APPELLANTf-DEFENDANTS' 
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MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDG-
MENT WAS CONTRARY TO LAW, JUS-
TICE AND EQUITY. 
The provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the Court may in the furtherance of justice re-
lieve a party * * * from a final judg-
ment, order or proceeding for the following rea-
sons (1) mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or ex-
cusable neglect; * * * (7) any other rea-
son justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1) (2) (3) or 
(4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken." (Em-
phasis added.) 
Under the provisions of the above cited Rule, the 
trial Court has considerable latitude of discretion in 
granting or denying motions to set aside default judg-
ments, but it cannot act arbitrarily and should be gen-
erally indulgent toward permitting full inquiry and knowl-
edge of disputes so that they can be settled advisedly and 
in conformity with law and justice. It is ordinarily an 
abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judg-
ment where there is reasonable justification or excuse 
for defendant's failure to appear and timely application 
is made to set aside the default judgment. (Mayhew 
vs. Standard Gilsonite Company, 14 U. 2d 52, 376 P. 2d 
951.) (Emphasis added.) There is no dispute that the 
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motion of appellant-defendant was timely made after 
default notice was received by him. It is the contention 
of appellant-defendant that the Lower Court abused its 
discretion and acted arbitrarily in that there was reason-
able justification for setting aside the default judgment 
against appellant-defendant under the facts and cir-
cumstances that existed. 
The affidavit of plaintiff's attorney, admits in part 
that there existed a valid dispute on the question of 
liability between plaintiff and appellant-defendant. 
Counsel for plaintiff states in his affidavit: 
"However, there was some mention during the 
course of this conversation that Pacer was to 
service and repair the motorcycle in exchange 
for Frank C. Myers racing the motorcycle under 
the Pacer name" (R. 35). 
It is undisputed that appellant-defendant denied 
liability under the contract from the time a demand 
letter was allegedly sent to him by plaintiff's counsel (R. 
34). The facts and circumstances clearly indicate that 
the appellant-defendant was mislead or lulled into 
thinking that i f i f warn not liable under the contract 
and that had convinced plaintiff's attorney accord-
ingly. This is evidenced by the fact that plaintiff's at-
torney delayed in taking a default judgment against 
appellant-defendant for approximately one (1) year 
after the service of summons upon appellant-defendant 
and after he had held telephone conversations both prior 
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to suit and shortly after service of summons upon appel-
lant-defendant (R. 34-36). 
In addition to the above situation, other circum-
stances existed which would constitute reasonable justi-
fication for setting aside the default judgment in that 
repossession of the motorcycle which occurred on or about 
January 3, 1973, approximately six (6) months before 
the action was commenced,* There has been no sale or 
disposition of the motorcycle repossessed and retaken 
by Zions First National Banl^' There is no indication 
on the Installment Sale and Security Agreement that 
the same was reassigned or repurchased by plaintiff 
giving rise to the question as to whether or not Pacer 
Sport & Cycle, Inc., was the real party and interest in 
this action) and the apparent alteration of the date of 
the contract. Plaintiff's complaint (R. 47-48) is silent 
as to the sale and assignment of the Installment Sale and 
Security Agreement to Zions First National Bank, the 
repossession of the motorcycle, the disposition of the 
motorcycle, if any, and the purchase back or reassign-
ment of the Installment Sale and Security Agreement 
from Zions First National Bank to plaintiff, Pacer Cycle 
(R. 47-48). 
In the case of Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Company, 
et al, (123 U. 416, 260 P. 2d 741), this Court stated: 
'
fOn motion to vacate a default judgment, dis-
cretion must be exercised in furtherance of just-
tice and the Court will incline toward granting 
relief in a doubtful case so that party may have 
a hearing.9' (Emphasis added.) 
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Looking at the facts presented in a light most favorable 
to appellant-defendant and assuming from the affi-
davit (R. 37-38) that he was induced into signing the 
Installment Security Agreement on the representations 
allegedly made by Robert Reeves, as set forth in the 
statement of facts herein, coupled with the repossession 
of the motorcycle without any sale or disposition thereof, 
certainly qualifies this case as one that should be given 
full hearing in the furtherance of justice and equity. 
Adding to these facts, the honest belief of appellant-de-
fendant, Carl W. Myers, that he had no liability under 
the Installment Agreement and that the agreement was 
a nullity, the long delay before default judgment was 
taken against him, which added to his belief that he was 
not liable under the contract, would constitute reasonable 
justification or excuse for his failure to appear. (See 
Ney vs. Harrison, 5 U. 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 114; Chrysler 
vs. Chrysler, 5 U. 2d 415, 303 P. 2d 995; Central Finance 
Company vs. Kynaston, 22 U. 2d 284, 452 P. d 316.) 
It is the contention of appellant-defendant, Carl W. 
Myers, that this case is patently one that Rule 60(b) 
contemplated and the homer Court abused its discretion 
in failing to grant his motion to set aside the default 
judgment against him in that there existed reasonable 
justification for doing so. The ends of justice and equity 
require that the order denying defendant's motion to set 
aside the default judgment be reversed and a trial of the 
issues be held. 
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P0IN1 • II .' • 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEN Y-
I N G »ELLANT- DEFENDANTS \ 1 0 -
'!•*' -ik" \Sii:E DEFAULT JUDG-
MENT' IN THAT RESPONDENT-JMAIN-
TTFT \<\]\ in -n P O M P I ,Y WITT) ? *^ W, 
JL1K- M^spondent-plaintiff, "through its agent, Zions 
First National Muni, repossessed from defendant, Frank 
Myers, th«> motorcycle purportedly sold under the In-
stallment Sale and Security Agreement, which is the sub-
ject of this action, on or about January 3, 1973 (R. 50). 
Suit was commenced approximately six, (6) months later 
after repossession and the record is void of what, if any, 
disposition was made of the motorcycle in accordance 
with the provisions of Title 70A-9-501 et seq. of the Utah 
Code Annotated 1 953 as amended. Title 70A-9-503 of 
the Utah Code grants to the secured party -the right to 
take possession of collateral upon default of the debtor. 
Title 70A-9-504 grants to the secured party after default 
the right to sale, lease, or otherwise dispose of any of the 
collateral and directs how the proceeds of any such dis-
position shall be applied. Title 70A-9-504(l) (b) requires 
the secured party to apply proceeds of the disposition 
of 'Collateral to satisfaction of the indebtedness secured 
by the security interest under which any disposition is 
made. IInder the provisions of 70A-9-504 (3) the secured 
party is required to give notice to the debtor of any pub-
lic or private sale in connection with the disposition of 
collateral. The provisions are as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
"(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by 
public or private proceeding and may be made 
by way of one or more contracts * * * 
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to 
decline speedily in value or is of a type customar-
ily sold on a recognized market, reasonable not-
ification of the time and place of any public sale 
or reasonable notification of the time after which 
any private sale or other intended disposition 
is to be made shall be sent by the secured party 
to the debtor. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
70A-9-505(2) provides: 
"(2) In any other case involving consumer 
goods or any other collateral, a secured party 
in possession may, after default, propose to re-
tain the collateral in satisfaction of the obliga-
tion. Written notice of such proposal shall be 
sent to the debtor * * *. If the debtor or 
other person entitled to receive notification ob-
jects in writing within thirty (30) days from 
the receipt of the notification or if any other 
secured party objects in writing within thirty 
(30) days after the secured party obtains pos-
session, the secured party must dispose of the 
collateral under Section 70A-9-504. In the ab-
sence of such written objection m the secured 
party may retain the collateral and satisfaction 
of the debtor's obligation." (Emphasis added.) 
The facts and record clearly show that the respondent-
plaintiff, Pacer Cycle, has totally failed to comply with 
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code in re-
taking possession of the motorcycle and the disposition 
made thereof, if any. If in fact the respondent-plaintiff 
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has disposed of the colLteim it repossessed, it has failed 
to give the notice ivquuvd to be given under 'the provi-
sions of 70A-9-504(3) and should be precluded from hav-
ing a deficiency judgment against defendants, (Atlas 
Thrift Co, vs. Horan (Cal.), 1 04 Cal. Rptr. 315; ' -i. 
App. 3rd ) 
Where, as in tins rase, I IK1 seemed party fails to' 
comply with the above cited provisions in the retaking 
and disposition of collateral under a security agreement, 
the debtor is granted a remjedy under the provisions of 
70A-9-607Q ), whi^b — i ^ -
 3S follows: 
"If it is established that the secured party is not 
proceeding in accordance with the provisions of 
this part, disposition may be ordered or re-
strained on appropriae terms and conditions. If 
the disposition has occurred the debtor * * * 
has a right to recover from the secured party any 
loss caused by a failure to comply with the pro-
visions of this part. If the collateral is consumer 
goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any 
event, an amount not less than the credit service 
charge plus ten percent of the principal amount 
of the debt or the time price differential plus 
ten percent of the cask price.79 (Emphasis 
added.) 
It would clearly appear under the provisions of the above 
cited statute that the appellant-defendant and his son 
both have a claim against fhf respondent-plaintifI foi 
its failure to comply with law. This in and of itself should 
h;i\" lven reasonable justification for the Cu-uii to grant 
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appellant-defendant's motion to set aside the default 
judgment and allow all of the issues to be presented to 
the Court for determination so that the case may be de-
termined advisedly and in conformance with law and 
justice. 
A review of the cases that have been decided under 
Title 70A-9-507 from other jurisdictions indicates that 
the remedy provided by this Section is not exclusive, 
and therefore, does not preclude barring a deficiency 
judgment when a sale of collateral has not been properly 
conducted or where the party conducts himself in a man-
ner so unfair or so unreasonable as to amount to a re-
tention of the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. 
(Atlas Thrift Company vs. Horan (supra); Harris vs. 
Brower (Md.), 295 A. 2d 870.) In the case of Leasco 
Data Processing Equipment Corporation vs. Atlas Shirt 
Company, (N. Y. 323, N. Y. S. 2d 13), the Court stated: 
"When a creditor fails to give notife to a debtor 
of resale of collateral, he may be barred from 
obtaining a deficiency judgment." 
Further, the California Court in the case of Atlas Thrift 
Company vs. Horan (supra), stated: 
"As U. C. C. 9-507 does not expressly declare 
that it provides an exclusive remedy, the pre-
Code law continues under which a creditor fail-
ing to sell the collateral properly was barred 
from obtaining a deficiency judgment." 
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In the case of Bradford vs. Lindey Chevrolet, (Ga. 
161 S. E. 2d 904), the Court stated: 
"If the creditor repossesses the collateral and 
retains it without any excuse for not selling it 
without demand for payment for fifty (50) days 
before suit and for over sixteen (16) months 
from the time of filing suit to date of trial, such 
conduct constitutes a recision and satisfaction 
of the contract and the creditor cannot recover 
any deficiency from the debtor." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Also, in the case of Northern Trust Company vs. Kryken-
dall, (111. 273 N. E. 2d 526), the Court stated: 
"Under consumer protection statute it may be 
held that the giving of proper notice is essential 
to a proper sale of collateral and that a proper 
sale of collateral is a condition precedent to lia-
bility for a deficiency judgment, with result that 
when proper notice is not given, the creditor is 
not entitled to a deficiency judgment." (Empha-
sis added.) 
The law is opposed to the creditor taking possession of 
the collateral and then delaying unreasonably before 
disposing of it as required by law. To continue to hold 
the collateral would certainly depreciate its value, and 
thus, lessen the amount of recovery that could be ap-
plied to the obligation owing by the debtor. (See U. S. 
vs. Perrnie (D. C. Neb.), 339 F. Supp. 702.) 
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It is the contention of appellant-defendant, Carl W. 
Myers, that respondent-plaintiff, Pacer Cycle, has failed 
to comply with the requirements of law in retaking pos-
session of collateral as a secured party and making proper 
disposition thereof. That by reason of its failure to com-
ply with law, Pacer Cycle should be deemed to have 
elected to retain possession of the collateral in full satis-
faction of the claimed obligation. The default judgment 
against appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, should be 
set aside as having no force and effect in law, and fur-
ther the respondent-plaintiff, Pacer Sport & Cycle should 
be barred from taking a deficiency judgment against 
either of the defendants in the action. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, contends that 
the Lower Court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to set aside the default judgment entered against 
him where there existed ample and reasonable justifica-
tion for so doing. Further, the fact that the respondent-
plaintiff, Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc., has failed to comply 
with law in failing to make a proper disposition of the 
motorcycle repossessed by it as a secured party, and 
under the provisions of Title 70A-9-501 et seq., the de-
fault judgment against Carl W. Myers should be set 
aside as a matter of law, and the respondent-plaintiff 
be precluded from taking a deficiency judgment against 
either defendants in this action. For the foregoing rea-
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sons, the order of the Lower Court denying the motion 
of appellant-defendant should be reversed and the de-
fault judgment against him be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. H. FANKHAUSER of 
COTRO-MANES, WARR, 
FANKHAUSER & BEASLEY 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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